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Determining a Corporation’s Principal Place of 
Business: A Uniform Approach to Diversity 
Jurisdiction 
Lindsey D. Saunders∗ 
Where is a corporation located for purposes of diversity ju-
risdiction? As this question is fundamental to many lawsuits 
involving a corporation, we might expect the answer to be clear. 
Federal courts, however, use various tests to determine a cor-
poration’s location, providing several possible answers. 
Surprisingly, scholars have been slow to address the lack of 
uniformity in this important area. Perhaps the legal commu-
nity hesitates to disrupt widely accepted principles that the 
federal courts have used for almost half a century.1 However, 
having various answers to the question of a corporation’s loca-
tion is not ideal. Nonuniformity encourages forum shopping at 
the federal level, breeds uncertainty, and, in many cases, 
serves to thwart Congress’s intent to limit federal jurisdiction. 
The adoption of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA or 
the Act), which makes it easier for corporate defendants to get 
into federal court, further complicates the situation.2 There are 
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 1. The diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, was amended in 
1958 to establish that a corporation is a citizen of both its place of incorpora-
tion and its principal place of business. Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415, 415 
(1958) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)); see also S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 2 
(1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3099. That is when the federal 
courts began to develop the now widely accepted methods for determining the 
location of a corporation’s principal place of business from those tests used to 
interpret the same language under the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 4. 
 2. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (to be 
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now more opportunities for plaintiffs, defendants, and their at-
torneys to shop around for the best forum, class of plaintiffs, or 
choice of parties to sue. 
Diversity jurisdiction, while familiar, continues to stoke 
heated debate and litigation all the way to the Supreme Court.3 
Because access to federal courts requires a jurisdictional basis,4 
the resourceful attorney will always look for a way to attack the 
opposing party on jurisdictional grounds. The interplay of 
CAFA with the nonuniformity of the principal place of business 
test provides a whole new dimension to this game. 
This Note argues that either Congress or the Supreme 
Court should adopt a uniform test for determining a corpora-
tion’s principal place of business for purposes of federal diver-
sity jurisdiction. Part I of this Note briefly explains the history 
of diversity jurisdiction and the development of the federal 
courts’ principal place of business tests. Part II describes each 
of the tests currently in use—the “nerve center” test, “corporate 
activities” test, and “total activity” test—and the circuit split 
regarding their application. Part III discusses the importance 
of designating a uniform test in light of CAFA and finds that, 
without one, forum shopping and “party-shopping” are encour-
aged. Part IV of this Note discusses the advantages and disad-
vantages of either limiting a corporation’s citizenship to its 
state of incorporation or choosing one uniform method for de-
termining a corporation’s principal place of business. It con-
cludes that the latter is the better option. Part IV also dis-
cusses three main considerations in selecting a test: providing a 
true representation of the corporation, fulfilling Congress’s in-
tent, and lessening the administrative burden on the courts. 
Finally, Part V proposes a uniform test based upon the total ac-
tivity test. 
I.  HISTORY OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND 
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS TESTS 
The Constitution confers upon the federal courts the power 
to adjudicate civil actions between parties from different 
 
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1711–15, 1332, 1335, 1603, 1453, 1441, 1651, 2074, 
2071). 
 3. See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 126 S. Ct. 606, 610–16 (2005); 
Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 125 S. Ct. 2904, 2904 (2005) (mem.), granting cert. 
to 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 4. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 326–27 (1867) (in-
dicating that jurisdiction is necessary for the Court to decide a matter). 
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states.5 Congress currently limits diversity jurisdiction to cases 
where the amount in controversy is at least $75,000 and no de-
fendants are citizens of any state in which a plaintiff is a citi-
zen.6 Although an individual may be a citizen of only one state, 
a corporation may have dual citizenship—it is a citizen of the 
state in which it is incorporated and of the state where it has 
its principal place of business.7 
Congress added the dual citizenship provision to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332—the diversity statute—in 1958 in order to reduce the 
federal courts’ caseload.8 Under the old statute, a corporation 
was only a citizen of its state of incorporation.9 Therefore, a 
corporation engaged in local business could get into federal 
court if sued by a citizen of that same state merely because it 
had a corporate charter from a different state.10 This meant 
that many cases arising under state law and between nondi-
verse parties were sneaking into the federal court system and 
burdening the federal docket. 
Diversity jurisdiction is intended to provide an unbiased 
forum for foreign citizens.11 Congress’s intent was to protect 
those foreign parties “against the prejudices of local courts and 
local juries by making available to them the benefits and safe-
 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This section provides: 
The district courts shall have [diversity] jurisdiction of all civil actions 
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 
. . . and is between— 
  (1) citizens of different States; 
  (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; 
  (3) citizens of different States in which citizens or subjects of a 
foreign state are additional parties; and 
  (4) a foreign state . . . and citizens of a State or of different States. 
Id.; see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “For the purposes of this section . . . a corporation 
shall be deemed to be a citizen of any [s]tate by which it has been incorporated 
and of the [s]tate where it has its principal place of business . . . .” Id. § 1332(c) 
(emphasis added). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (1958) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
1332); see also S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101 (“In adopting this legislation, the committee feels 
that . . . it will ease the workload of our [f]ederal courts by reducing the num-
ber of cases involving corporations which come into [f]ederal district courts on 
the fictional premise that a diversity of citizenship exists.”). 
 9. See S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3099, 3101. 
 10. See id. at 3101–02; see also Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. 
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
 11. See S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 (1958). 
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guards of the [f]ederal courts.”12 But, a corporation is unlikely 
to face prejudice in a state where it has its principal place of 
business, so allowing it to remove to federal court when sued in 
its home state does not further Congress’s goal.13 By amending 
§ 1332, Congress sought to address these problems and reserve 
the federal courts for those cases in which the parties are truly 
diverse.14 
While this concept may seem rather straightforward, 
§ 1332 does not provide a method of determining a corporation’s 
principal place of business. Rather, Congress felt that there 
was ample precedent interpreting “principal place of business” 
under the Bankruptcy Act for the courts to make their own de-
terminations.15 Around the time of the 1958 amendment, courts 
used two tests to determine a corporation’s principal place of 
business under the Bankruptcy Act: the “home office” test and 
the “actual place of operations” test.16 Courts using the home 
office test considered where the corporation kept its books and 
bank accounts, where it prepared correspondence and business 
reports, where it paid debts and generated sales, and where the 
officers lived and held shareholder meetings.17 Courts using the 
actual place of operations test considered the location of the 
corporation’s mining, production, or manufacturing facilities.18 
Without more guidance from Congress, the federal courts 
apply variations and combinations of three different tests to de-
termine a corporation’s principal place of business under 
§ 1332. The Bankruptcy Act’s home office test has evolved into 
the “nerve center” test and is the only test used in the Seventh 
Circuit.19 The actual place of operations test is now the “corpo-
 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. at 4–5. 
 14. See id. at 5. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Note, A Corporation’s Principal Place of Business for Purposes of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 44 MINN. L. REV. 308, 316 (1959) (referring to the two 
tests developed in the bankruptcy context as the “home office” test and the 
“actual place of operations” test). 
 17. See, e.g., Shearin v. Cortez Oil Co., 92 F.2d 855, 858 (5th Cir. 1937); 
Burdick v. Dillon, 144 F. 737, 737 (1st Cir. 1906). 
 18. See, e.g., Dryden v. Ranger Ref. & Pipe Line Co., 280 F. 257, 259 (5th 
Cir. 1922) (“The business of a corporation is its activities in the acquisition or 
production of that which its charter authorizes it to produce or acquire, and its 
dealings with its customers . . . .”); Cont’l Coal Corp. v. Roszelle Bros., 242 F. 
243, 247 (6th Cir. 1917). 
 19. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Cammon, 929 F.2d 1220, 1223 
(7th Cir. 1991); Dimmitt & Owens Fin., Inc. v. United States, 787 F.2d 1186, 
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rate activities” test and is the only test used in the Third Cir-
cuit.20 Some circuits have combined the two tests into the “total 
activity” test,21 while still others pick and choose which test to 
apply in any given situation.22 As one businessman recently 
testified before Congress, “the rule is quite muddy.”23 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING THE  
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS TEST 
As discussed above, the federal courts apply three main 
tests to determine a corporation’s principal place of business: 
the nerve center test, the corporate activities test, and the total 
activity test. 
A. THE NERVE CENTER TEST 
The nerve center test considers a corporation’s principal 
place of business to be the place from which corporate decision 
making, policy making, control, and direction emanate.24 More 
simply, it is the location of the “corporation’s brain.”25 Under 
this test, the corporation’s principal place of business will usu-
ally, if not always, be the state in which its executive headquar-
ters are located.26 
 
1191 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 20. See Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 853–54 (3d Cir. 1960). 
 21. See MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 
2005); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Russellville Steel Co., 367 F.3d 831, 836 (8th 
Cir. 2004); Gadlin v. Sybron Int’l Corp., 222 F.3d 797, 799 (10th Cir. 2000); 
Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 162 (6th Cir. 1993); J.A. Olson Co. v. 
City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 411 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 22. See Diaz-Rodriguez v. Pep Boys Corp., 410 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2005); 
Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 314 (4th Cir. 2001); Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a 
Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2001); R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom 
Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir. 1979); Masterson-Cook v. Criss Bros. 
Iron Works, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 23. Hearing on Regulatory Relief Proposals Before the S. Banking, Hous. 
and Urban Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Steve Bartlett, 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Financial Services Roundtable), avail-
able at 2005 WLNR 9917862. 
 24. See Capitol Indem. Corp., 367 F.3d at 835; Metro. Life Ins. Co., 929 
F.2d at 1223; Vareka Invs., N.V. v. Am. Inv. Props., Inc., 724 F.2d 907, 910 
(11th Cir. 1984); Lugo-Vina v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 574 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 
1978); Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
 25. Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th 
Cir. 1986). 
 26. Id. (“[W]e look for the corporation’s brain, and ordinarily find it where 
the corporation has its headquarters.” (emphasis added)). But, in Metropolitan 
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For example, the defendant corporation in Scot Typewriter 
Co. v. Underwood Corp. manufactured typewriters in Connecti-
cut, supplies in New Jersey, and missile components in Cali-
fornia, and then shipped the products to over one hundred 
United States cities.27 Most of the corporation’s tangible prop-
erty and the majority of its employees were located in Con-
necticut, but the corporation’s executive offices were in New 
York.28 The New York offices handled policy making and coor-
dinated all of the personnel, public relations, purchasing, ad-
vertising, and sales-promotion activities.29 Taking this evidence 
into consideration under the nerve center test, the district court 
found that the corporation’s principal place of business was 
New York.30 
The Seventh Circuit only applies the nerve center test.31 It 
has explained that “[s]ome courts prefer a vaguer standard. 
They look not just to where the corporation has its headquar-
ters but also to the distribution of the corporation’s assets and 
employees. We prefer the simpler test. Jurisdiction ought to be 
readily determinable.”32 
B. THE CORPORATE ACTIVITIES TEST 
Under the corporate activities test, a corporation is a citi-
zen of the state where the majority of the corporation’s produc-
 
Life Insurance Co., the same court was more definitive and stated that “a cor-
poration has a single principal place of business where its executive headquar-
ters are located,” rather than “ordinarily” finding it where the executive head-
quarters are located. 929 F.2d at 1223. 
 27. Scot Typewriter, 170 F. Supp. at 864. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 865. 
 31. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co., 929 F.2d at 1223 (“This court follows the 
‘nerve center’ approach to corporate citizenship . . . .”); Dimmitt & Owens Fin., 
Inc. v. United States, 787 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 32. Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th 
Cir. 1986); see also Dimmitt & Owens Fin., Inc., 787 F.2d at 1191 (“Since cer-
tainty of jurisdiction is a desideratum too—the parties ought to know defi-
nitely what court they belong in, and not face the prospect that their litigation 
may be set at naught because they made a wrong guess about jurisdiction—
this circuit has long used a simple ‘nerve center’ test for principal place of 
business.”). However, the Seventh Circuit has also stated that “[t]here are 
cases where a corporation’s headquarters may be divided between states and 
cases where the nominal headquarters isn’t really the directing intelligence of 
the corporation, and those cases could give trouble even under a simple ‘nerve 
center’ test.” Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1282–83. 
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tion and service activities are located.33 Courts look to the loca-
tion of manufacturing, production, and sales centers, as well as 
the location of employees and officers.34 Furthermore, courts 
may consider the location of tangible property, but such an 
element is “of lesser importance.”35 
For example, in Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., the de-
fendant corporation’s officers were located in New York, its 
board of directors met there, and financial decisions were made 
in that state.36 But the committee in charge of manufacturing, 
transportation, and general operations was located in Pennsyl-
vania, along with a greater majority of the employees and tan-
gible property than in any other state of corporate operations.37 
Thus, under the corporate activities test, the Third Circuit 
found that Pennsylvania was the corporation’s principal place 
of business.38 
In adopting the corporate activities test, the Third Circuit 
held that “it is the activities rather than the occasional meeting 
of policy-making Directors which indicate the principal place of 
business.”39 The Third Circuit has even gone so far as to state 
that an inactive corporation does not have dual citizenship.40 
Because business activities are determinative of the corpora-
tion’s principal place of business, a corporation that does not 
conduct business activities cannot have a principal place of 
business.41 
C. THE TOTAL ACTIVITY TEST 
The total activity test is a combination of the nerve center 
and corporate activities tests—it takes into consideration all of 
the relevant factors regarding the location of both the corpora-
tion’s managerial and production- and service-related activi-
ties.42 This test is used in the Fifth,43 Sixth,44 Eighth,45 Tenth,46 
 
 33. See, e.g., Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Russellville Steel Co., 367 F.3d 831, 
836 (8th Cir. 2004); Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 
(9th Cir. 2001); Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960). 
 34. See Tosco Corp., 236 F.3d at 500; Kelly, 284 F.2d at 854. 
 35. Kelly, 284 F.2d at 854. 
 36. See id. at 853–54. 
 37. See id. at 854. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 163 (6th Cir. 1993) (stat-
ing that courts are to “tak[e] into consideration all relevant factors and [weigh] 
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and Eleventh47 Circuits. Some of these courts, like the Fifth 
Circuit, have created presumptions that apply in certain fact 
scenarios: 
(1) [W]hen considering a corporation whose operations are far flung, 
the sole nerve center of that corporation is more significant in deter-
mining [the] principal place of business; (2) when a corporation has 
its sole operation in one state and executive offices in another, the 
place of activity is regarded as more significant; but (3) when the ac-
tivity of a corporation is passive and the ‘brain’ of the corporation is in 
another state, the situs of the corporation’s ‘brain’ is given greater 
significance.48 
The circuits that have adopted the total activity test look 
at all corporate activities because they have “recognize[d] that 
the nature of a corporation’s activities will impact the relative 
importance of production activities, service activities, and cor-
porate decision making.”49 Also, they find that this test is more 
flexible and is better suited to a modern business environment 
where corporations have complex and varied configurations.50 
 
them in light of the facts of each case”); Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 
547, 549 (5th Cir. 1992); Vareka Invs., N.V. v. Am. Inv. Props., Inc., 724 F.2d 
907, 910 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 43. See, e.g., Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 
2004); Harris, 961 F.2d at 549; J.A. Olson Co. v. City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 
404 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 44. See, e.g., Gafford, 997 F.2d at 163. 
 45. See, e.g., Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Russellville Steel Co., 367 F.3d 831, 
836 (8th Cir. 2004). The dissent also recognized “the newly adopted ‘total ac-
tivities’ test for determining a principal place of business.” Id. at 838 (Colloton, 
J., dissenting). 
 46. See, e.g., Gadlin v. Sybron Int’l Corp., 222 F.3d 797, 799 (10th Cir. 
2000); Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7 F.3d 909, 915 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
 47. See, e.g., MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th 
Cir. 2005); Bel-Bel Int’l Corp. v. Cmty. Bank of Homestead, 162 F.3d 1101, 
1106 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 48. J.A. Olson Co., 818 F.2d at 411 (citations omitted); see also Sweet Pea 
Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that where a company’s activities are not concentrated in one place, “[a] dis-
trict court [is] entitled to give these ‘nerve-center’-related facts greater signifi-
cance in determining [the principal place of business]”); Riggs v. Island Creek 
Coal Co., 542 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that where a corporation 
conducts the majority of its business nationally, “the corporation’s headquar-
ters assumes more significance as the compelling factor in the principal place 
of business test”). 
 49. Capitol Indem. Corp., 367 F.3d at 836. 
 50. See id. (stating that the court “find[s] [the total activity] test to be the 
most appropriate and least limiting of the tests other circuits have applied”); 
Amoco Rocmount Co., 7 F.3d at 915 (“This totality of the circumstances ap-
proach avoids the difficult choice between the two other tests, and also pro-
vides the needed flexibility to address the myriad incarnations of corporate 
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For example, in Village Fair Shopping Center Co. v. Sam 
Broadhead Trust, a real estate company had its only office in 
New York but had invested in a shopping center in Mississippi, 
a shopping center in California, and commercial paper and 
bank accounts in New York.51 All corporate decisions were 
made in New York, and two of the three stockholders resided in 
that state.52 In applying the total activity test, the Fifth Circuit 
determined that New York was the corporation’s principal 
place of business because the activity in that state was the 
most significant: New York was home to the management ac-
tivities and the most tangible assets.53 
Another example is Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., in 
which the plaintiff corporation engaged in oil and gas invest-
ment activities in the United States and had its only domestic 
office in Texas.54 Its executive offices were located in Calgary, 
Canada.55 The company’s shareholder meetings were held in 
Calgary, where most major officers lived, and all major deci-
sions relating to corporate operations were made at that loca-
tion.56 However, since Texas was the only state in which the 
company engaged in operations, the court found that the 
“‘nerve center’ did not predominate in determining its principal 
place of business.”57 It upheld the lower court’s determination 
that, “[u]nder the total activity test, a corporation . . . with sig-
nificant administrative authority and activity in one state and 
lesser executive offices but principal operations in another state 
has its principal place of business in the latter.”58 Because the 
company conducted its daily business in Texas and earned all 
revenue through those operations, all business assets and re-
cords were located in Texas, and some of the officers resided 
there, the Fifth Circuit determined that Texas was the corpora-
tion’s principle place of business.59 
 
form and operations.”). 
 51. See 588 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. at 433–34. 
 54. See 369 F.3d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 55. See id. at 876. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 877 (alteration in original). 
 59. See id. at 876–77. 
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D. USING THE NERVE CENTER AND CORPORATE ACTIVITIES 
TESTS SEPARATELY 
Although courts commonly combine the nerve center and 
corporate activities tests, some circuits choose to retain them 
individually. The nerve center test used to be the First Circuit’s 
primary test.60 Now, however, the First Circuit requires district 
courts to “use either the nerve center test or the [corporate ac-
tivities test],61 depending on the characteristics of the corpora-
tion.”62 That circuit has determined that the nerve center test 
was created only for cases involving a “large corporate enter-
prise with complex and farflung activities.”63 So, courts apply 
the corporate activities test to determine a corporation’s princi-
pal place of business when most of that corporation’s physical 
operations are located in one state, even if the corporate head-
quarters are located in another state.64 
The Second Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia recognize both tests by creating presump-
tions. For instance, both courts give the corporate headquarters 
more weight in determining the principal place of business of a 
corporation that has operations spread across multiple states.65 
But, when corporate operations are centralized, the Second Cir-
cuit attributes less weight to the nerve center and instead fo-
cuses on the state where the corporation has the most public 
interaction.66 
 
 60. See, e.g., Lugo-Vina v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 574 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 
1978). The First Circuit had looked to a line of cases following Scot Typewriter 
Co. v. Underwood Corp., in which the court stated that the principal place of 
business, or “nerve center,” was the place from which the corporation’s “offi-
cers direct, control, and coordinate all activities without regard to locale, in the 
furtherance of the corporate objective.” 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
That line of cases has determined the “nerve center” to be “only in the locale 
where a substantial degree of direction of the enterprise, if not all important 
decision-making, occurs.” Lugo-Vina, 574 F.2d at 43–44. 
 61. The First Circuit has chosen to use the term “locus of operations,” but 
notes that it often “is largely indistinguishable” from the “corporate activities 
test.” Diaz-Rodriguez v. Pep Boys Corp., 410 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 62. Id. The First Circuit concedes that the framework it sets forth is very 
similar to the “total activity” test. Id. at 61 n.4. 
 63. De Walker v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 569 F.2d 1169, 1172 (1st Cir. 1978) 
(quoting Epstein v. Guilford Indus., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963)). 
 64. See Diaz-Rodriguez, 410 F.3d at 61. 
 65. See R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 655 (2d 
Cir. 1979); Masterson-Cook v. Criss Bros. Iron Works, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 810, 
812 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 66. See R.G. Barry Corp., 612 F.2d at 655. 
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The Fourth Circuit also recognizes both the nerve center 
and corporate activities tests, but has not combined them into 
the total activity test.67 Instead, this circuit has found that the 
corporate activities test “presumes the existence of physical op-
erations by which a corporation’s presence in different states 
can be measured. As a result, the test is applied when a com-
pany has multiple centers of manufacturing, purchasing, or 
sales.”68 On the other hand, “a corporation engaged primarily in 
the ownership and management of investment assets . . . is not 
really geographically bound, . . . [and] a jurisdictional test fo-
cusing on the location of operations makes little sense” because 
those corporations can easily move their assets.69 
The Ninth Circuit applies the corporate activities test 
“unless the plaintiff shows that its activities do not substan-
tially predominate in any one state.”70 This determination re-
quires the plaintiff to compare the corporation’s activities in the 
particular state with its activity in other individual states.71 
The factors to consider are “the location of employees, tangible 
property, production activities, sources of income, and where 
sales take place.”72 In Breitman v. May Co. California, where 
the defendant corporation had operations in over thirty states, 
the Ninth Circuit decided that the corporate activities test was 
inappropriate because the business activities did not substan-
tially predominate in a single state.73 Thus, it applied the nerve 
center test.74 
The Ninth Circuit adopted this approach after determining 
that “courts generally assign greater importance to the corpo-
 
 67. See Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 314 (4th Cir. 2001); Athena Auto., 
Inc. v. DiGregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 290 (4th Cir. 1999); Peterson v. Cooley, 142 
F.3d 181, 184 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 68. Peterson, 142 F.3d at 184; see also Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 290. 
 69. Peterson, 142 F.3d at 184. 
 70. Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 
2001); see United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 763 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 
1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 1997); Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 
1094 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We hold that, where a majority of a corporation’s busi-
ness activity takes place in one state, that state is the corporation’s principal 
place of business, even if the corporate headquarters are located in a different 
state. The ‘nerve center’ test should be used only when no state contains a 
substantial predominance of the corporation’s business activities.”). 
 71. See Tosco Corp., 236 F.3d at 500. 
 72. Id.; Indus. Tectonics, Inc., 912 F.2d at 1094. 
 73. See 37 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 74. See id. 
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rate headquarters when no state is clearly the center of corpo-
rate activity, and assign greater importance to the location of 
the corporate business when substantially all business opera-
tions take place in a single state.”75 And, the Ninth Circuit has 
defended its application of § 1332: First, corporations tend to 
have more contact with the public in the state in which they 
conduct the majority of their business—not the location where 
policy making occurs—thus, there should not be local prejudice 
in that state.76 Second, litigation in the corporate context usu-
ally results from the corporation’s public interaction.77 There-
fore, the state in which the corporation has the most public con-
tact is also the state in which it is most likely to be subject to 
litigation.78 If that state is considered the corporation’s princi-
pal place of business, it will help reduce the federal caseload.79 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING A UNIFORM  
TEST TO DETERMINE A CORPORATION’S  
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS 
The lack of uniformity in determining a corporation’s prin-
cipal place of business for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is 
problematic. For one thing, there is a desire for uniformity that 
is inherent in the federal court system.80 Without it, the abu-
sive practice of forum shopping will be prevalent at the federal 
level. Furthermore, the recently-enacted CAFA is meant to re-
duce the amount of adversity faced by corporate defendants.81  
 
 
 75. Indus. Tectonics, Inc., 912 F.2d at 1093; see Bialac v. Harsh Bldg. Co., 
463 F.2d 1185, 1186 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[W]here a corporation is engaged in only 
one business activity, substantially all of whose operations occur in one state, 
even though policy and administrative decisions are made elsewhere, the state 
of operations is the corporation’s principal place of business.”). 
 76. See Indus. Tectonics, Inc., 912 F.2d at 1094 (“Activities such as em-
ployment of personnel, purchasing of materials, and sales of goods and ser-
vices increase local familiarity with the corporation. This local contact allevi-
ates problems with local prejudice against outsiders and justifies consideration 
of the corporation as a citizen of that state.”). 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. Reducing the federal caseload was one of the goals in adding 
the principal place of business citizenship requirement. See S. REP. NO. 85-
1830, at 3 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101. 
 80. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965); Bank of the U.S. v. 
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 83 (1809). 
 81. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3, 6. 
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Until all circuit courts apply one test, however, Congress’s in-
tent will not be served. 
A. FORUM SHOPPING AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
One reason that federal courts exist is to provide uniform-
ity in the law,82 and one function of a uniform system is to 
eliminate the incentive to forum shop.83 Forum shopping is the 
practice by which a litigant attempts to “choos[e] the most fa-
vorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard.”84 
Although some argue that forum shopping is a litigation tool to 
be employed when necessary to adequately represent a client,85 
both the courts and Congress strongly disfavor the practice.86 
Forum shopping is often thought of in the context of decid-
ing whether to file suit in a state court versus a federal court.87 
In this case, however, it is a matter of filing in one federal court 
or another.88 Because the federal courts lack a uniform test, the 
 
 82. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 83 (“One great object in allowing citi-
zens of different states to sue in the federal courts, was to obtain a uniformity 
of decision in cases of a commercial nature.”); see Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 
(“‘One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about uniform-
ity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is especially 
true of matters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings . . . .’” 
(quoting Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 
1963)). Although that case refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it 
seems that the same concept would be true of the federal diversity statute—
because a case may be dismissed under the uniform Federal Rules for lack of 
diversity, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), a uniform test for determining whether 
diversity exists should be used rather than a particular circuit’s local rule. 
 83. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (attempting to 
limit state-federal forum shopping by holding that “[e]xcept in matters gov-
erned by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied 
in any case is the law of the state”). 
 84. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 681 (8th ed. 2004). Forum shopping has 
also been defined as “the practice of plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking out the least 
defendant-friendly judicial jurisdictions in which to file lawsuits.” Forum 
Shopping Under Fire, BUS. INS., Jan. 31, 2005, at 8. 
 85. See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 
1691 (1990) (“[T]he adversarial role of the lawyer demands forum shopping 
when necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the client.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 
508–09 (2001); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; House Again Takes Lead in Meaningful 
Tort Reform, BUS. INS. May 30, 2005, at 8 (discussing a bill “which would re-
quire mandatory sanctions on attorneys who bring frivolous lawsuits and 
which would curb the abusive practice of so-called ‘forum shopping’”). 
 87. It is widely believed that federal courts are more defendant-friendly 
forums than are state courts. See Heather R. Barber, Removal and Remand, 
37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (2004). 
 88. See Bruce V. Spiva & Jonathan K. Tycko, Indirect Purchaser Litiga-
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incentive remains to find the most favorable forum. This be-
comes an issue where, for example, a corporation is sued in 
three separate circuits, each applying a different test. It may be 
the case that each circuit will find the corporation’s principal 
place of business to be in a different state. The savvy plaintiff ’s 
attorney will attempt to sue the corporation in the circuit 
where the test used will favor the plaintiff ’s position.89 Such 
differential treatment provides no stability or predictability for 
those corporate parties whose business activities make them 
prone to suit in more than one circuit. 
B. THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 
Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in 
order to “assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members 
with legitimate claims” and to provide for expanded federal ju-
risdiction.90 Congress also intended to prevent forum shop-
ping.91 In a legal system devoid of a uniform principal place of 
business test, however, forum shopping may simply be replaced 
by “defendant- and plaintiff-shopping.” 
CAFA makes it easier for corporate defendants to get into 
federal court. It does this by allowing a case filed as a class ac-
tion in state court to be removed to federal court regardless of 
whether the defendant is a citizen of that state.92 In fact, if the 
defendant properly removes the class action, there is a “strong 
preference” that it be heard in federal court.93 
 
tion on Behalf of Consumers After CAFA, 20 ANTITRUST, Fall 2005, at 12, 12 
(“To the extent outcome is determined by forum, the outcome of any particular 
case is likely to be determined less by whether it is decided in a federal or 
state court than by the particular federal court that ultimately decides it, just 
as is the case now with respect to both state and federal courts.”). 
 89. Forum Shopping Under Fire, supra note 84 (“It doesn’t matter that, in 
many cases, the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ ties to the jurisdiction are tenuous 
at best. The result can be something considerably less than justice for the de-
fendants.”). 
 90. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(1), 119 
Stat. 4, 5 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453). 
 91. See GEORGENE M. VAIRO, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005, 
at 1 (2005). “The purpose of the Act . . . is ‘to prevent judge shopping to States 
and even counties where courts and judges have a prejudicial predisposition 
on cases.’” Id. (quoting 151 CONG. REC. S999 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (state-
ment of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee)). 
 92. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5, 119 Stat. 
4, 12 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453). 
 93. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3, 41. 
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The Act also makes it easier for defendants to get into fed-
eral court by eliminating the requirement of complete diversity 
in the class action context. Instead of requiring every single 
member of a class of plaintiffs to be from a different state than 
every named defendant, as is necessary for federal jurisdiction 
over other types of lawsuits,94 this provision enforces a much 
looser requirement: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in 
which— 
  (A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State differ-
ent from any defendant; 
  (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citi-
zen subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; 
or 
  (C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and 
any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign 
state.95 
Thus, it is only necessary that a single member of the 
plaintiff ’s class be of diverse citizenship from any named de-
fendant. The Act does, however, afford federal district courts 
the discretion to decline jurisdiction in certain situations,96 and 
it even requires them to decline jurisdiction in others.97 
 
 94. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
 95. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9 
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)) (emphasis added). 
 96. See id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)). This section of the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 amends 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) to provide as fol-
lows: 
A district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the to-
tality of the circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction . . . over a 
class action in which greater than one-third but less than two-thirds 
of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and 
the primary defendants are citizens of the State in which the action 
was originally filed based on consideration of— 
(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or in-
terstate interest; 
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the 
State in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of 
other States; 
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that 
seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction; 
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct 
nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defen-
dants . . . . 
Id. (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)) (emphasis added). 
 97. See id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)). 
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The situations in which a federal court must decline juris-
diction require a determination of which defendant is the “pri-
mary” defendant and which defendants are “significant”: 
A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction . . . 
 (A)(i) over a class action in which— 
 (I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed 
plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in 
which the action was originally filed; [and] 
 (II) at least [one] defendant is a defendant— 
(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members 
of the plaintiff class; 
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for 
the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and 
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was 
originally filed . . . or 
(B) two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff 
classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens 
of the State in which the action was originally filed.98 
As is evident, one of the criteria that the court considers in 
declining jurisdiction is whether more than two-thirds of the 
plaintiffs, and a defendant whose conduct is a significant 
source of the complaint, are “citizen[s] of the State in which the 
action was originally filed.”99 Or, if at least two-thirds of all 
proposed plaintiffs, and the primary defendants, are citizens of 
that state, then the court must decline to exercise jurisdiction, 
and the plaintiffs will succeed in remaining in a local state 
court.100 One commentator has noted that the courts will make 
these determinations based upon the defendants named in the 
plaintiffs’ cause of action.101 Because the plaintiffs will likely 
want to remain in state court, CAFA creates an incentive to 
avoid naming out-of-state defendants in their complaint.102 
 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). The portion laid out in the text has been se-
lected for purposes of highlighting the difference between “primary” and “sig-
nificant” defendants, but there are additional requirements that have been 
omitted which are nevertheless necessary for a court to decline jurisdiction 
under this provision. See id. 
 99. Id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc)). In conjunction 
with the necessary citizenship of that defendant and class of plaintiffs, the 
main injuries caused by that defendant must have occurred in the state where 
the action was originally filed. Id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)). 
 100. See id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(4)(A)–(B)). 
 101. See VAIRO, supra note 91, at 30. 
 102. See id. One class action defense lawyer has already noticed suspicious 
behavior on behalf of plaintiffs’ attorneys. See Correy E. Stephenson, Class Ac-
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This means that plaintiffs who have a choice of defendants will 
engage in “defendant-shopping.” They will sue the corporation 
whose principal place of business under the relevant circuit test 
will be the state in which the plaintiffs are also citizens.103 
Thus, the defendant corporations will be prejudiced in certain 
jurisdictions depending upon which test the circuit applies. 
The lack of uniformity also encourages “plaintiff-shopping” 
under CAFA. Parties involved in litigation in federal court have 
the ability to transfer to a different federal court for conven-
ience purposes.104 Although the transferred case will not be 
subject to the transferee court’s choice of law,105 and thus the 
plaintiff ’s attorney will not fear losing control over the substan-
tive law to be applied, she will still fear losing the ability to 
litigate in her chosen venue. This provides yet another reason 
to avoid the federal system where the defendant may seek a 
change of venue. So, where the attorney has the ability to rep-
resent numerous plaintiffs, she will engage in “plaintiff-
shopping” to form a class from those individuals who will de-
stroy diversity under CAFA. 
In the end, CAFA may cause as much prejudice as Con-
gress intended for it to reduce. The goal is no longer to find a 
local court in which the judge and jury will treat the party’s 
cause of action more favorably, as the defendant will have an 
easier time removing the case to a federal court in any jurisdic-
tion. Rather, the goal is to choose a defendant or class of plain-
tiffs based on satisfying those limited instances in which diver-
 
tion Reform Law Is Slow to Impact System, MINN. LAW., Oct. 24, 2005, at 5 
(“What I’ve seen in some complaints is plaintiffs’ counsel attempting to track 
the language of the exceptions as closely as possible, and frame their allega-
tions to the statutory exceptions.” (quoting Donald R. Frederico, a Boston class 
action defense lawyer)). 
 103. See Andrée Sophia Blumstein, A New Road to Resolution: The Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 41 TENN. B.J., Apr. 2005, at 16, 23 (2005) 
(“[P]laintiffs’ counsel will have an incentive to fit the [exceptions] in order to 
avoid removal . . . . A carefully pled state court case is especially likely to re-
main in state court when the defendants are companies with their principal 
places of business in the forum state.”). 
 104. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000) (“For the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil ac-
tion to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”). 
 105. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990) (“[A] transferee 
forum [must] apply the law of the transferor court, regardless of who initiates 
the transfer.”); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (“[W]here de-
fendants seek transfer, the transferee district court must be obligated to apply 
the state law that would have been applied if there had been no change of 
venue.”). 
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sity can be destroyed and the defendant prevented from remov-
ing to federal court. Therefore, in a system with no uniform 
principal place of business test, CAFA may lessen forum shop-
ping only to encourage “defendant- and plaintiff-shopping.” 
C. CASE IN POINT: AN EXAMPLE OF THE DISPARITY 
To illustrate the problem, consider a hypothetical corpora-
tion.106 D is an oil company incorporated in Delaware. Its main 
corporate headquarters are in Wisconsin; however, it also has 
refining and lubricant company headquarters in Texas and 
marketing headquarters in Arizona. D’s New Jersey refinery 
comprises roughly 40 percent of D’s total refining capacity, and 
D’s Texas refinery comprises roughly 30 percent. D has two lu-
bricant blending and packaging facilities in New Jersey and 
two in separate states. D operates 37 percent of its retail loca-
tions in Texas with others scattered in various states, including 
Wisconsin and New Jersey. D has convenience stores located in 
numerous states, including Wisconsin and Texas, with the most 
stores located in New Jersey. D generates roughly 30 percent of 
its sales from its New Jersey operations and 25 percent from its 
Texas operations. Finally, 24 percent of D’s employees are lo-
cated in New Jersey and 21 percent in Texas. 
 Assume that D is sued under state law for product liabil-
ity in excess of $75,000 in Wisconsin by a Wisconsin citizen, in 
New Jersey by a New Jersey citizen, and in Texas by a Texas 
citizen. For various reasons, D prefers to enter federal court in 
each case. Each of those states is part of a different federal cir-
cuit and applies a different principal place of business test. 
Wisconsin is part of the Seventh Circuit and therefore ap-
plies the nerve center test. The important consideration is the 
location of the executive headquarters. In this scenario, the 
analysis is rather straightforward—Wisconsin is the site of the 
main corporate headquarters, and therefore, Wisconsin is the 
corporation’s principal place of business. 
New Jersey is part of the Third Circuit, which applies the 
corporate activities test. The important factors to consider are 
the location of any manufacturing and production centers, as 
well as the location of sales outlets and employees. Wisconsin is 
home to none of D’s corporate activities, so it is not the princi-
 
 106. The facts used in this example are loosely based upon those of the 
plaintiff corporation in Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Environment. 
See 236 F.3d 495, 501–02 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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pal place of business under this test. New Jersey and Texas, 
however, are both home to some of D’s corporate activities. New 
Jersey houses 40 percent of D’s refinery capacity, while Texas 
only holds 30 percent. Likewise, New Jersey has two packaging 
facilities, while Texas has none. New Jersey also has the great-
est number of D’s convenience stores and employees, but Texas 
has the majority of D’s retail locations and comes in a close sec-
ond in sales and number of employees. When weighing this in-
formation, the Third Circuit would likely determine that D’s 
principal place of business is New Jersey because that is the 
state in which most of D’s manufacturing, production, and sales 
occur. 
Texas is part of the Fifth Circuit, which applies the total 
activity test and considers the location of the corporation’s 
managerial, production, and service activities. Despite having 
the most significant managerial activities, Wisconsin is proba-
bly not D’s principal place of business under this test because it 
houses none of D’s corporate activities. Although New Jersey 
houses the majority of the corporate activities, it has no mana-
gerial offices. Texas, on the other hand, is the home of two of 
the miniheadquarters. Furthermore, Texas does have a major-
ity of the retail operations and comes in a close second in every 
other corporate activity. Thus, the Fifth Circuit would likely 
find that Texas is D’s principal place of business because it has 
more executive offices and only slightly less principal opera-
tions. 
D’s principal place of business is different under each of 
the available tests. This means that D has citizenship in four 
states (including Delaware, its state of incorporation), rather 
than the two provided for in § 1332,107 and it will not be able to 
invoke diversity jurisdiction in any of the above cases. Fur-
thermore, if these are all separate class-action claims, it is pos-
sible that CAFA provisions destroying diversity would be satis-
fied in all three cases. 
Now, compare D to X, a corporation that collaborates with 
D to create numerous products and which has a factual situa-
tion very similar to D’s scenario. The only difference is that X ’s 
miniheadquarters are in New Jersey rather than Texas. X will 
still have its principal place of business in Wisconsin under the 
Seventh Circuit’s nerve center test and in New Jersey under 
the Third Circuit’s corporate activities test. However, X ’s prin-
 
 107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000). 
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cipal place of business will also be in New Jersey under the 
Fifth Circuit’s total activity test. New Jersey is home to some of 
X ’s managerial activities and the majority of its corporate ac-
tivities, while Texas houses none of X ’s managerial activities. 
Therefore, X will be able to invoke diversity jurisdiction in 
Texas and get into federal court. 
This exemplifies the prejudice that D will face in compari-
son to X. The corporations are similarly situated in terms of the 
amount of contact each has with the public and the possibility 
of being named as a defendant in a lawsuit. Due to the nonuni-
formity of the principal place of business test, Texas plaintiffs 
with a claim against both corporations will have an incentive to 
sue D rather than X to avoid diversity and remain in the state 
courts. If the lawsuit is a class action with X as the only possi-
ble defendant, a prospective plaintiff ’s attorney will have an in-
centive to select from its possible clients a class of plaintiffs 
that can sue in Wisconsin or New Jersey. This incentive will in 
turn negatively affect the Texas citizens, as the attorney will 
want to represent fewer of them in comparison to Wisconsin or 
New Jersey citizens. 
Designating a uniform principal place of business test will 
help alleviate these inefficiencies and will avoid prejudicing 
corporate defendants. Corporations will no longer be adversely 
situated as compared to similar entities because of a legal fic-
tion. A uniform test will also limit potential “party-shopping” 
under CAFA and will keep corporate defendants in local court 
only when the parties truly are not diverse. 
IV.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Because uniformity is desirable in the federal court system, 
and the “shopping” problems discussed above will only become 
more prevalent under CAFA, the courts should use one method 
to determine a corporation’s principal place of business. There 
are several possible solutions, but three in particular are the 
strongest contenders: limit corporations’ state of citizenship to 
the state in which they are incorporated; choose one of the 
three tests discussed above and require all federal courts to use 
that test; or, follow the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits in 
recognizing both tests and develop a uniform test that empha-
sizes certain factors depending upon the factual circumstances. 
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A. REMOVE THE DUAL CITIZENSHIP PROVISION AND LIMIT 
CORPORATIONS’ CITIZENSHIP TO STATE OF INCORPORATION 
The easiest solution to the principal place of business prob-
lem is to eliminate the provision altogether and simply main-
tain that corporations are only citizens of their state of incorpo-
ration. This would be an administrative dream because a 
simple glance at the corporation’s charter papers would settle 
the issue. This method could potentially save all parties in-
volved, including the courts, from expending resources on sub-
ject-matter-jurisdiction sub litigation. 
First, determining a corporation’s citizenship would not re-
quire lengthy and costly discovery proceedings.108 Therefore, a 
party would not have “to weigh the difficulty and expense of 
proving the existence [or nonexistence] of diversity against the 
advantages to be gained from entering [or not entering] the 
federal courts.”109 Any bargaining power that a defendant cor-
poration with deep pockets may have over a plaintiff by way of 
threatening to challenge jurisdiction would be removed.110 This 
would be especially important to the plaintiff whose claim in-
volves a matter in which time is of the essence.111 Second, there 
would be reduced risk that, because a party may challenge sub-
ject matter jurisdiction at any point during the action,112 newly-
discovered data late in the litigation would result in a delayed 
dismissal due to lack of diversity. 
The drafters of Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 
9 adopted this solution in making a similar determination of 
where state security interests should be filed in a multistate 
transaction. Article 9 provides that some security interest fil-
ings are to be made “where the debtor is located.”113 Prior to the 
2001 revision, a debtor was “deemed located at his place of 
business if he ha[d] one,” or “at his chief executive office if he 
ha[d] more than one place of business.”114 The term “chief ex-
 
 108. See Note, supra note 16, at 322. 
 109. Id. Because the information regarding citizenship likely “would not 
add anything to the substantive cause of action, . . . its utility might not be 
commensurate with the cost of discovering it.” Id. 
 110. See id. at 323. 
 111. See id. 
 112. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the 
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the 
court shall dismiss the action.”). 
 113. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2001) (amended 2005); U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (1999) 
(amended 2001). 
 114. U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d). 
SAUNDERS_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:14:55 AM 
1496 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1475 
 
ecutive office” was not to mean the place where the corporation 
was organized, but rather the place where the business was 
managed.115 Even then, the drafters recognized that “[d]oubt 
may arise as to which is the ‘chief executive office’ of a multi-
state enterprise.”116 One scholar noted the significant burden 
this uncertainty placed on parties in terms of time and 
money.117 
Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9 addresses 
these problems. The security interest filing provisions now pro-
vide that a debtor corporation is located in its state of incorpo-
ration.118 So, a business incorporated in Delaware is located in 
Delaware, despite the fact that its executive office is in Minne-
sota and it conducts most of its business in Wisconsin.119 Thus, 
“all [of] the ambiguity about location [is] gone. The messy, prac-
tical question about where the CEO goes to work and whether 
that is the chief office [is not] relevant.”120 
Although limiting the principal place of business to the 
state of incorporation is efficient, it is contrary to Congress’s in-
tent to limit the federal caseload as discussed in Part I. Many 
corporations organized in Delaware conduct minimal business 
in that state.121 Therefore, it would be a rare situation in which 
diversity of citizenship could be destroyed for those corpora-
tions. A Delaware citizen would have to sue the corporation, 
which would be unlikely since the corporation has such mini-
mal contact with the public, and thus incurs minimal liability, 
 
 115. See U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 5(c). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Lynn M. Lopucki, Why the Debtor’s State of Incorporation Should 
be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REV. 
577, 581, 590, 597–98 (1995). 
 118. See U.C.C. § 9-307(e) (2005) (“A registered organization that is organ-
ized under the law of a State is located in that State.”). 
 119. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECURED TRANSACTIONS 800 (James 
J. White & Robert S. Summers eds., 5th ed. 2000). 
 120. Id. 
 121. As of 2003, half of all U.S. public companies were incorporated in 
Delaware. Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 32, 33 (2004). Delaware attracts these corporations because it 
has an advanced incorporation statute, a judiciary with expertise in the corpo-
rate realm, a state department devoted solely to its corporate citizens, and fa-
vorable tax laws. E.g., Rodman Ward, Jr. & Erin Kelly, Why Delaware Leads 
in the United States as a Corporate Domicile, 9 DEL. LAW. 15, 16–17 (1991). 
However, simply because these companies are incorporated in Delaware does 
not mean they do business there. Rather, the corporation is only required to 
have one person or entity in that state: the corporation’s “registered agent.” Id. 
at 18. 
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in that state.122 Therefore, by restoring § 1332 to its pre-1958 
status, which provided that a corporation was only a citizen of 
its state of incorporation, the federal caseload would increase. 
Such a change, although providing for certainty, administrative 
ease, and conservation of resources, would thwart Congress’s 
intent in amending the statute in the first place. 
B. RETAIN THE DUAL CITIZENSHIP PROVISION AND CHOOSE ONE 
METHOD TO DETERMINE A CORPORATION’S PRINCIPAL PLACE OF 
BUSINESS 
The more difficult solution is also the more appropriate 
choice. As Congress’s intent in amending § 1332 was to further 
limit federal jurisdiction, it seems clear that corporations 
should retain dual citizenship in this context. Therefore, either 
Congress or the Supreme Court should choose one method for 
use by the federal courts in determining a corporation’s princi-
pal place of business. The difficulty lies in choosing a method, 
and there are three main considerations: (1) Which test will 
produce a result that most accurately represents the nature of 
each individual corporation? (2) Which test best adheres to 
Congress’s intent? (3) Which test will be most workable from an 
administrative standpoint? 
1. Providing a True Representation of the Corporation 
The test that a court uses to determine a corporation’s 
principal place of business should be representative of the cor-
poration as a whole. As one court explained, “the issue is not 
the nerve center of a corporation or the place of activity of a 
corporation but, rather, the issue is the principal place of busi-
ness of the corporation.”123 Defining the issue as such, it seems 
relatively clear that the total activity test will provide the best 
representation of the corporation’s principal place of business. 
Unlike the nerve center test, which takes into account only the 
location of the corporate headquarters, or the corporate activity 
test, which considers only the site of the corporation’s largest 
production facility, the total activity test considers factors relat-
ing to both. That test will help the court to determine in which 
state the corporation has made itself at home—where it con-
 
 122. See Note, supra note 16, at 311–12 (“[S]uits involving the corporation 
are not as likely to arise in the state of incorporation as they are in the state or 
states where the corporation has contact with the public.”). 
 123. J.A. Olson Co. v. City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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ducts most of its business and managerial activities. 
Using an all-encompassing approach will ensure that the 
corporation cannot escape the local courts when the controversy 
is truly local. If the corporation merely needs one large execu-
tive office to satisfy the nerve center test, or one large factory to 
satisfy the corporate activities test, it can essentially choose its 
principal place of business just as it can choose its place of in-
corporation. In contrast, under the total activity test, the court 
can make its own determination and prevent the corporation 
from disguising its true form. 
In the end, “the principal place of business is a fact ques-
tion that follows no single inflexible test dependent solely upon 
the situs of the nerve center or upon the situs of activities of 
the corporation.”124 It is a question of where the corporation has 
made its home. The total activity test, in focusing on the entire 
corporation rather than only one aspect, best answers this 
question as it is the most representative of the corporation as a 
whole. 
2. Fulfilling Congress’s Intent 
At the outset, it seems that Congress has expressed con-
flicting interests regarding this issue. As discussed in Part I, 
Congress sought to decrease the federal caseload when it 
amended the diversity statute in 1958. The federal courts have 
limited jurisdiction,125 and Congress intended to further limit 
that jurisdiction by giving corporations dual citizenship.126 On 
the other hand, as discussed in Part III.B, Congress intended 
CAFA to increase federal jurisdiction with respect to class ac-
tions. 
The total activity test is the best choice for fulfilling Con-
gress’s intent as expressed in the 1958 amendment because it 
provides the broadest definition of citizenship. As discussed in 
Part II.C, that test examines all of the corporation’s activities 
to determine which state is the source of most of its important 
behavior. This is also likely to be the state in which plaintiffs 
injured by the corporation’s activities are most likely to be 
found—either because executive officers issue corporate direc-
tives in that state, most of the employees work in that state, or 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2, cl. 1. 
 126. See S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4–5 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02. 
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the most consumers are affected by the activities in that 
state.127 Where there is a greater chance of a corporation being 
subject to suit in a particular state by employees or consumers 
who are also citizens of that state, jurisdiction will be limited if 
the corporation also has citizenship there.128 As both parties 
would be citizens of the same state, that designation would de-
stroy diversity jurisdiction, thereby decreasing the possible 
number of suits that could ultimately be brought in federal 
court. 
Neither the nerve center test nor the corporate activities 
test will produce a comparably accurate result in every case. 
Under the nerve center test, the corporation’s principal place of 
business will not necessarily be the state where individuals apt 
to sue the corporation are most likely to be citizens.129 As dis-
cussed in Part II.A, the principal place of business will likely be 
the corporate headquarters. Although that may be an adequate 
designation for corporations that have relatively uniform facili-
ties spread across the country,130 it will not be representative 
of, for example, those corporations that have a small executive 
office in one state and a large manufacturing and distribution 
facility in another. The latter would be the state in which the 
corporation is most likely to injure plaintiffs, and so the nerve 
center test would not serve Congress’s intent in this type of 
situation. 
The corporate activities test would have a similarly inaccu-
rate result. For example, consider a nationwide corporation 
with relatively uniform service activities and very low-level 
managerial officers in nine states, and a corporate headquar-
ters located in a tenth state from which all control emanates. 
The corporate activities test would likely call the state with the 
largest service center the principal place of business. However, 
if that facility were only slightly larger than the rest, that re-
 
 127. See Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1094 (1990) 
(“[S]uits involving a corporation generally arise from its contacts with the pub-
lic.”). 
 128. See id. (“[C]onsidering a corporation to be a citizen of the state where 
it has the most public contact and greatest potential for litigation helps reduce 
the federal court diversity case load . . . .”). 
 129. See Note, supra note 16, at 319. 
 130. But see id. (“[I]f the home office test is used to determine the principal 
place of business of a nationwide corporation, it is unlikely that the number of 
diversity cases will be decreased to the extent hoped for by Congress. There is 
not necessarily a relationship between the location of the home office of such a 
corporation and the place where the most suits are likely to arise.”). 
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sult would not necessarily be representative of the place in 
which suits are most likely to arise. It may be that the corpo-
rate headquarters would be more responsible for suits arising 
at the various locations due to its control over policy and deci-
sion making. Therefore, this test would also produce results 
that defeat Congress’s intent. 
In order to best serve the 1958 amendment’s goal to limit 
federal jurisdiction, courts should apply the total activity test to 
determine a corporation’s principal place of business. That test 
will assess all of a corporation’s activities to find the state in 
which it ultimately affects the most individuals and is truly a 
citizen. Thus, the test will serve to destroy diversity in the state 
where the particular corporation is most likely to be sued, 
thereby limiting federal jurisdiction in accordance with Con-
gress’s intent. 
With regard to Congress’s intent in passing CAFA, it 
seems that the nerve center test is more appropriate because it 
provides a narrower definition of citizenship. As discussed 
above, application of the nerve center test will not necessarily 
produce a result indicative of the state in which a corporation is 
most likely to be sued by any given batch of plaintiffs because 
that test does not depend upon the corporation’s interaction 
with individuals to their detriment. Also, the nerve center test 
is less subject to construction by a court looking for ways to find 
that diversity does not exist. For these reasons, application of 
the nerve center test would increase federal jurisdiction as per 
Congress’s intent because there would be a lesser chance of de-
stroying diversity. 
Although Congress intended to expand federal jurisdiction 
under CAFA, it intended to do so only with regard to class ac-
tions.131 Setting the nerve center test as the rule would be det-
rimental in every other type of controversy with regard to Con-
gress’s overall intent to limit federal jurisdiction to those cases 
in which the parties are truly diverse. For these reasons, adop-
tion of the total activity test would best serve Congress’s intent. 
3. Lessening the Administrative Burden 
Determining a corporation’s principal place of business 
may prove administratively difficult in some instances, depend-
ing upon the amount and complexity of the information re-
 
 131. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 
4, 4–5 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1711). 
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quired and the corporation’s cooperation in providing such in-
formation. While none of the tests can account for the latter 
factor, it seems rather straightforward that the nerve center 
test would be an overall lesser burden on the courts and parties 
than the other tests. Although it may be the rare case in which 
the corporate activities test or total activity test would be easier 
to apply than the nerve center test, there may be instances in 
which they are as easy to apply. 
The nerve center test would in all situations require a sim-
ple inquiry as to the corporate headquarters. In cases in which 
there is one executive office, that office will be the principal 
place of business. In cases in which there are multiple manage-
rial offices, the one with the most authority and control will be 
the principal place of business. Information regarding those is-
sues should not be too difficult to obtain. The only problem that 
may arise is in the unlikely scenario in which there are two 
seemingly equal centers of managerial control. Then, the in-
quiry may be more difficult and require an increased expendi-
ture of resources. 
The corporate activities test would require a substantially 
greater investment of resources than the nerve center test. 
There will be the simple cases in which a corporation has one 
office and one manufacturing plant, and the latter will be the 
obvious choice for the principal place of business. In today’s 
business world, however, there will be many situations in 
which a corporation has several manufacturing plants, produc-
tion facilities, and service centers throughout the country. In 
such cases, courts must gather and analyze company statistics 
and financial reports to determine the principal place of busi-
ness. As compared to the nerve center test, this will consume 
substantially more time and money for all parties involved. 
Finally, the total activity test would require the greatest 
investment of resources. Although the corporation’s nerve cen-
ter is one consideration, this test also inherits the burden of de-
termining the center of the corporation’s operations. And, to 
compound matters, the managerial and corporate activities 
must be balanced to determine which location best represents 
the corporation’s total activities. There may rarely be a clear-
cut answer as to the corporation’s principal place of business. 
Rather, the process may be very lengthy as it requires gather-
ing double the amount of information that each of the other 
tests require and then balancing that information. However, 
five circuits currently use this test, and five recognize some-
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thing similar, so it seems that the courts have not been de-
terred by the administrative burden. 
While the nerve center test would be a lesser administra-
tive burden, administrative ease is not a satisfactory justifica-
tion for mislabeling a corporation’s principal whereabouts and 
thwarting Congress’s intent. Rather, the total activity test, or a 
version thereof—although probably more time consuming and 
expensive overall—produces a more accurate and reliable re-
sult that fulfills Congress’s intent. 
V.  THE PROPOSED TEST: A VERSION OF  
THE TOTAL ACTIVITY TEST 
This Note has shown that Congress or the Supreme Court 
would best serve the interests of the federal court system and 
public at large by adopting a uniform test to determine a corpo-
ration’s principal place of business. And this Note has proven 
that none of the existing tests is fully satisfactory. Thus, a new 
test is appropriate. The following proposed test is modeled upon 
the total activity test, setting forth some important factors for 
consideration and making one presumption that is to have ef-
fect only in limited circumstances: 
  A corporation’s principal place of business is to be determined by a 
balancing of all relevant factors regarding the location of the corpora-
tion’s managerial activities and production- and service-related activi-
ties. 
  The corporation’s principal place of business is located in the state 
in which the corporation has its greatest presence based upon an 
analysis of factors including, but not limited to, the location of the 
corporation’s: 
(a) executive headquarters and/or other managerial offices from 
which decision making, policy making, control, and direction 
emanate; 
(b) manufacturing, production, service, and sales centers; 
(c) income-producing activities; 
(d) officers and shareholders; 
(e) employees; and 
(f) tangible property. 
  Revenue generated in a given state, as determined by the corpora-
tion’s federal tax statements, is a proxy for determining the location 
of income-producing activities. 
  When considering a corporation whose operations are far-flung 
and relatively evenly distributed, there shall be a rebuttable pre-
sumption that, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, 
the sole nerve center of that corporation is its principal place of busi-
ness. 
  A corporation’s sole nerve center is the location of the corpora-
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tion’s main executive headquarters; those offices from which ema-
nates the highest level of decision- and policy-making authority. 
This proposed test addresses many of the concerns raised 
above: providing a true representation of each individual corpo-
ration, promoting administrative efficiency, and satisfying con-
tradictory congressional intent. Although it is a balancing test, 
which inherently involves some subjectivity, a corporation’s 
principal place of business is not a determination that is accu-
rately made using a bright-line rule like the nerve center test. 
Rather, corporations in a modern business environment have 
complex and varied structures. Their principal place of busi-
ness should therefore be determined by a flexible rule that 
places natural emphasis on certain of the corporation’s charac-
teristics such that its true place of citizenship is accurately rep-
resented. 
Any test that deviates from a bright-line rule leaves room 
for acts of judicial discretion. However, this test provides the 
courts with objective criteria on which to base their determina-
tion. The six decision-making factors are readily quantifiable 
based on an analysis of the corporation’s factual situation. This 
leaves less room for debate among the parties or subjective 
analysis by the decision maker. Thus, this test addresses the 
administrative efficiency concerns raised above about the total 
activity test. 
The rebuttable presumption also addresses administrative 
efficiency concerns in the class action context. Class actions are 
often invoked against large corporations whose activities are 
spread over numerous states, so most class actions will proba-
bly fall under this presumption. The proposed test is fact-
intensive, and a corporation with evenly distributed and far-
flung activities will produce a significant amount of data for the 
court to analyze. Because class actions are already more expen-
sive and time consuming than most types of litigation,132 this 
presumption lessens the administrative burden inherent in a 
total activity test by eliminating the expenditure of judicial re-
sources in this particular situation. 
The proposed test addresses Congress’s expressed intent 
both to broadly limit federal diversity jurisdiction and to nar-
rowly increase it under CAFA. As discussed in Part IV.B.2, the 
total activity test helps to limit federal jurisdiction while the 
nerve center test helps to expand it. Thus, the proposed test 
 
 132. See John Conyers, Jr., Class Action “Fairness”—A Bad Deal for the 
States and Consumers, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493, 497 (2003). 
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provides results consistent with congressional intent: it applies 
the total activity test in the majority of cases, and it raises a 
presumption for the nerve center test in situations that will 
probably include most class action lawsuits. 
The proposed test also promotes uniformity among the 
courts. For instance, the fact-intensive nature of the total activ-
ity test would normally raise concerns that three different cir-
cuits applying the same test would each determine a corpora-
tion’s principal place of business to be in a different state. 
However, because each circuit would examine the same objec-
tive data, they would likely reach similar results. Furthermore, 
one circuit’s finding of a corporation’s principal place of busi-
ness would serve as persuasive precedent to the next circuit to 
encounter the question. 
Balancing tests inevitably have some pitfalls and draw-
backs. But the proposed test is narrowly tailored to incorporate 
congressional intent in both limiting federal diversity jurisdic-
tion on a broad level and expanding it in limited circumstances 
in light of CAFA. It leaves some analysis to the decision maker, 
but at least all of the federal courts would base their analysis 
on the same factors. Until Congress or the Supreme Court 
adopts a uniform test like the one proposed, uncertainty, preju-
dice, and “shopping” incentives will continue to plague corpo-
rate litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress amended the diversity jurisdiction statute in 
1958 to provide that a corporation is a citizen of both its state of 
incorporation and the state where it has its principal place of 
business. Congress intended to decrease the federal courts’ 
caseload, but it provided very little guidance to the federal 
courts as to the method by which they should determine a cor-
poration’s principal place of business. Rather, the circuits apply 
three different tests: the nerve center test, corporate activities 
test, and total activity test. This nonuniformity encourages fo-
rum shopping at the federal level and, with the introduction of 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, it encourages “defen-
dant- and plaintiff-shopping” in the class action context. It also 
breeds uncertainty and, in many cases, serves to thwart Con-
gress’s intent. 
In order to address the problems raised by the nonuniform 
application of § 1332, Congress or the Supreme Court should 
adopt a uniform test for determining a corporation’s principal 
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place of business. This Note proposes a test based on the total 
activity test, which balances factors relating to all of a corpora-
tion’s activities—managerial, production, and service related. 
Such a test is well suited to a modern business environment, 
and it reflects the true nature of each individual corporation 
while also producing results in accordance with congressional 
intent. Presumably, this is the type of consideration Congress 
intended the federal courts to make when determining the loca-
tion of a corporation’s principal place of business. 
